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ABSTRACT 
Total digital media advertising spending of $72.5 billion surpassed total 
television Ad spending of $71.3 billion for the first time ever in 2016. Approximately $39 
billion, or 54% of the digital media advertising spend, involved pre-programmed 
software that purchased Ads on behalf of a buyer in Real-Time Bidding (RTB) settings. A 
major concern for Ad buyers is sub-optimal spending in RTB settings owing to biases in 
the attribution of customer conversions to Ad impressions. The purpose of this research 
is twofold. First, identify and propose a novel experimental design and analysis plan for 
to handling a previously unidentified and unaddressed source of endogeneity: 
count/quality simultaneity bias (CQB). Second, conduct a field study using data for Ad 
response rates, cost, and observed consumer behavior to solve for the profit maximizing 
daily Ad frequency per customer. One large online retailer provided data for Ad 
impressions, bid costs, response rates, revenue per visit, and operating costs for 153,561 
unique users over 23 days. Unique visitors were randomly assigned to one of seven 
treatment groups with one, two, three, four, five, and six impressions per day limits as 
well as a final condition with no daily impression cap. Ordinary least square models 
(OLS) were fit to the data and a non-linear relationship between Ad impressions and site 
visits demonstrating declining marginal effect of Ad impression on site visits after an 
optimal point. The results of the field study confirmed the existence of negative CQB and 
demonstrated how my novel experimental design and analysis can reduce the negative 
bias in the estimate of impression quantity on customer response. Second, managers 
interested in improving the efficiency of advertising spend should restrict display 
advertising to only the highest quality inventory through specific site targeting and by 
leveraging direct buys and private marketplace deals. This strategy ensures that 
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subsequent impressions are not of lower quality by restricting the pool of possible 
impressions from a homogenous set of high quality inventory. 
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To Baker – Persevere in your own way. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After a record growth of 22% between 2015 and 2016, total expenditure on digital 
media advertising stood at roughly $72.5 billion, surpassing total ad expenditures on 
television ($71.3 billion)1. Nearly four out of five of all digital advertisement transactions 
occur programmatically, and the growth trend in programmatic ad spending indicate 
that by the end of 2019, 84% of all digital ad spending will be through programmatic 
advertising2. In general, ‘Programmatic Advertising’ refers to any process that involves a 
pre-programmed software that undertakes the purchase of ads on behalf of a buyer in 
real time. There are two major variations in programmatic advertising, Real-Time 
Bidding (RTB) where ad buyers bid for advertisements in real-time second-price and 
Programmatic Direct (PD) where ad buyers negotiate prices directly with publishers such 
that the software guarantees advertisements when buyers bid above a fixed price. 
Currently, RTB accounts for 67% of total expenditures on digital display advertising. In 
an RTB system, ad buyers submit their bids in real-time via a Demand-Side Platform 
(DSP) that interacts with a Supply Side Platform (SSP) managing publishers’ inventory 
through an Ad Exchange that facilitates the real-time purchase process electronically. 
The DSPs in the RTB framework provide the technology infrastructure to manage real-
time bidding decisions, the ability to track and target customers of interest to the buyers, 
and customization of their bidding mechanisms to maximize the buyer-determined 
outcome (e.g., clicks, visits, conversions)3.  
                                                        
1http://adage.com/article/digital/digital-ad-revenue-surpasses-tv-desktop-iab/308808/ 
2https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/299332/forecast-nearly-80-of-us-display-spending-
will.html 
3Buyers who wish to gain more control over the purchase process can either opt for a ‘programmatic direct’ 
mechanism to directly negotiate a fixed-price deals with the publishers or instead opt for ‘private market 
places’ where the buyers that can bid in a platform or restricted thereby increasing the chances of winning a 
real-time auction. In either case, buyers lose some of the cost efficiencies associated with RTB to ensure that 
their ads reach the desired inventories.  
2 
 
The benefits of RTB notwithstanding, a major concern for buyers is the sub-
optimal spending in automated buying owing to biases in the attribution of customer 
conversions to ad impressions. DSPs employ a machine learning approach to 
customizing bidding algorithms in real-time to maximize profits for the platform. Buyers 
currently have no way of ascertaining the efficacy of these algorithms in attributing user 
behavior to display ads, as they largely remain a black box from the perspective of the ad 
buyer. Thus, a wide variety of biases can drive the algorithm’s decision to bid for 
individual pieces of inventory in real-time. The biases can be owing to selection issues 
driven by end-user/customer behavior, or targeting algorithms for performance 
optimization employed by DSPs. 
There have been multiple attempts to quantify the impact of display advertising 
in the literature. Initially, the best available data was observational (Chatterjee, 
Hoffman, and Novak 2003; Drèze and Hussherr 2003; Manchanda et al. 2006), which, 
while providing novel insights, suffered from sources of endogeneity due to selection bias 
created by heterogeneous customer behavior. Previous literature identified and proposed 
novel experimental solutions to deal with customer activity bias (CAB) (Lavrakas, Mane, 
and Laszlo 2010). Hoban and Bucklin (2015) displayed PSA advertisements to their 
control group to account for customer activity bias when measuring the causal effect of 
the presence of advertising. Often, black-box algorithms purchase ads and optimize their 
decision process as they collect new information. In the case of PSA experiments, the 
algorithms potentially optimize to two different messages resulting in selective targeting 
bias. Johnson, Lewis, and Nubbemeyer (2016) suggest the use of “ghost ads” or 
predicted ads to combat selective targeting bias. Finally, Johnson, Lewis, and Reiley 
(2017) utilize a field experiment to generate exogenous variation in the number of 
impressions shown to quantify the marginal impact of advertising on a single site.  To 
3 
 
the best of my knowledge, previous research has yet to address the measurement of the 
marginal impact of advertising with heterogenous inventory quality. 
Statement of the Problem 
While prior work has furthered the understanding of CAB and selective targeting 
bias, there was a gap in the literature regarding inventory quality as a source of 
customer-independent bias. In an RTB setting, the quality of inventory is unknown at 
the time of auction. As an ad buyer bids on each impression, he realizes the quality of 
placement at the same time as the quantity of advertisements served is determined. This 
count/quality simultaneity creates a previously unaddressed source of endogeneity in the 
state of the art experiments. Due to the simultaneous realization of count and quality, it 
is impossible to randomly distribute the quality of impressions independent of the 
quantity of impressions, creating an unobserved correlation between count and quality, 
or count/quality simultaneity bias (CQB). The omission of inventory quality in prior 
research confounds existing conclusions about the marginal value of display advertising.  
For advertisers interested in quantifying the marginal impact of display ads, the 
experimental ideal randomly assigns customers to different frequency goal groups and 
programs the bidding algorithm to maximize the probability each customer receives her 
assigned a number of ads. Ignoring the role that customer activity bias plays in the 
algorithms ability to meet this goal, this design creates an additional source of bias, 
referred to as term goal incongruence bias. This bias occurs in situations where 
algorithms necessarily must bid on lower quality inventory with a higher probability of 
winning for customers in treatment groups with high-frequency goals. Alternatively, the 
algorithms can bid more strategically on potentially higher quality more expensive 
inventory for customers in lower frequency goal groups. In this situation, there is 
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another source of unobserved correlation between count and quality created by the 
algorithm bidding to achieve the stated goal.  
Purpose of the Study  
 The purpose of this study is twofold. First, identify and propose a novel solution 
to handling the previously unaddressed source of endogeneity: count/quality 
simultaneity bias. Second, conduct a field study using the proposed experimental design 
to solve for the profit-maximizing daily ad frequency per customer. I employed a novel 
experimental design using daily frequency caps instead of frequency goals to generate 
exogenous variation in the number of impressions to which each customer is exposed. 
Solely applying frequency caps still results in an experiment that suffers from CAB and 
CQB. The goal of the frequency caps is not to create a perfect experiment, but to generate 
the ideal instrumental variables that enable me to handle both customer activity bias and 
count quality simultaneity. By using frequency caps instead of frequency goals, I remove 
goal incongruence as a possible source of bias. Within my experiment, I program the 
precise rules of the bidding algorithm such that they are entirely independent of any 
variation in customer characteristics, eliminating selective targeting bias. Partnering 
with a large online retailer, I implement the experimental framework in a large-scale 
field study and analyze data using two-stage least squares regression to obtain unbiased 
estimates of the marginal impact of display advertising. Finally, I demonstrate how my 
finding can support decision making when used in an optimization framework to identify 
the profit-maximizing daily frequency caps to program into an RTB algorithm.  
Research Questions 
RQ1. In an RTB setting, what is the optimal number of daily display Ads per 
customer after adjusting for customer activity bias and count/quality simultaneity bias? 
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RQ2. In an RTB setting, what is the profit maximizing number of daily display 
Ads per customer after adjusting for customer activity bias and count/quality 
simultaneity bias for a range of economic values per visit?  
Organization of the Study 
The remainder of the document is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I describe 
the display advertising landscape as it relates to RTB, and review the relevant literature 
on programmatic ad buying, the challenges to measurement, and the current state of the 
art in practice. I identify a previously undefined source of bias afflicting the 
measurement of ad effectiveness and propose a novel solution to remediate the bias. 
Chapter 3 outlines my empirical approach and describes how my novel experimental 
design uniquely solves both new and known sources of bias in the measurement of ad 
effectiveness. I describe the data and illustrate the presence of customer-independent 
sources of bias. Chapter 4 presents results and discussion of my two-stage least squares 
solution. Chapter 5 concludes with discussing the implications of my work for ad buyers 
in the RTB environment and demonstrating how this work can be used to tune bidding 
algorithms to utilizing information on the diminishing marginal benefit of increasing 
impression frequency independent of all other effects.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Programmatic Advertising, RTB, and DSPs 
The emergence of real-time bidding (RTB) in programmatic advertising (PA) has 
ushered in a number of intermediaries such as SSPs, DSPs, Ad Exchanges (ADX), and 
data exchanges (DX). These agencies facilitate RTB auctions between a vast number of 
publishers and advertisers resulting in the seamless scaling of the auction process. 
Wang, Zhang, and Yuan (2016) provide an elaborate exposition of the RTB environment, 
its benefits, and challenges. From the perspective of Ad buyers, the use of RTB has two 
important benefits. First, Ad buyers no longer must deal with numerous disparate ad-
networks to buy impressions in bulk. SSPs and ADXs have developed RTB auctions as a 
mechanism to sell the publisher surplus (Liu and Viswanathan 2014; Zhu and Wilbur 
2011). PA ensures that Ad buyers delegate the bidding process to a DSP that interacts 
with an ADX4 to buy real estate on the Advertiser’s behalf, thus simplifying the buying 
process5. Second, Ad buyers can now rely on DSPs to develop an automated bidding 
strategy by using algorithms that consider inputs from Ad buyers and the general market 
characteristics from DXs that provide reports on customer behavior on websites across 
the Internet. This DSP service relieves the ad buyer of the need to design publisher 
specific bidding strategies to optimize bidding. (Skiera and Abou Nabout 2013; Yao and 
Mela 2011). 
ADXs typically employ second price auctions under a ‘pay per impression’ 
mechanism. The optimal bidding strategies in these types of auctions rely on knowledge 
of the true value of an advertisement (Edelman and Ostrovsky 2007). Thus, running an 
                                                        
4 The ADXs aggregate several ad networks. 
5 Publishers who work with SSPs to register with different ADXs can still employ a diverse set of rules to both 
filter and modify bids from ad buyer to increase the long-term value of their real estate. However, the ad 
buyers no longer manage the diversity of ad network rules directly 
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efficient ad campaign relies on one’s ability to attribute profitable customer behavior to 
an advertiser. Herein lies the key challenge facing both ad buyers and DSPs in the RTB 
environment. DSPs employ machine-learning tools to associate ad impressions with 
customer response for performance optimization to the extent they have information 
from DX agencies and Ad buyers. Similarly, campaign managers of individual ad buyers’ 
associate impressions with more granular aspects of customer response such as 
conversions and purchase amount with the intent of customizing the DSPs algorithms. 
Despite the benefit of having the DSP aid the development and execution of a bidding 
strategy, it is in the interest of the ad buyer to guard against inaccurate valuations of a 
marginal ad impression. 
Effectiveness of Display Advertisements 
Given the rapidly growing economic importance and the precise control over 
targeting and messaging provided to marketers, it is paramount that marketers 
understand how to measure the effectiveness of display advertising. The complexity of 
the display advertising ecosystem described above creates unique challenges to 
quantifying the causal impact of digital advertising. Despite these challenges, previous 
literature has made substantial progress in enumerating, quantifying, and solving many 
of the biases that plague the measurement process.  
In one of the earliest attempts to measure the effectiveness of display advertising, 
Chatterjee, Hoffman, and Novak (2003) utilize observational data to link advertising 
exposure to consumer response. Using non-RTB impression data from a single site with 
multiple content pages and mandatory visitor registration, they model the consumer’s 
probability of clicking on an advertisement. Their results show that there is a 
heterogeneous click response to advertisements with a decline in click-through-rate as 
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the number of impressions increases from one to eleven, followed by an increase in click-
through-rate as the number of impressions increases beyond eleven.  
While modeling click-through-rate is an important type of consumer response, 
ultimately firms are interested in how their ads influence buying behavior. Manchanda et 
al. (2006) attempted to make this link between display ad exposure and purchase 
behavior. Using observational data shared by a third party from a non-RTB setting, the 
authors model the consumer decision of if and when to purchase as a function of 
advertising exposure. They find a positive relationship between advertising and purchase 
incidence with the strongest effect found in those customers who had previously 
purchased. 
It is reasonable to assume that targeted advertisements have, at worst, no effect 
on individual behaviors. Using a large-scale field experiment, Goldfarb and Tucker 
(2011) found that targeting has a negative effect when advertisements are highly 
obtrusive. Interestingly, they also found that less obtrusive, but highly targeted have a 
positive impact on customer response. 
A unique feature of display retargeting is the ability to personalize the advertising 
message to the customer. While at first, it may seem reasonable to do this in all 
situations; prior work has shown this may not always be true. Lambrecht and Tucker 
(2013) use non-RTB impression data collected in a quasi-experimental setting to show 
that highly personalized ads outperform a generic equivalent only when consumers have 
narrowed their search. In a series of field experiments in non-RTB settings, Bleier and 
Eisenbeiss (2015) examine the role of timing and placement factors on the effect of 
personalization. They find that the effectiveness of personalization is related to the 
proximity in time from when a user was last on an advertiser’s site and the exposure to a 
display ad. In a follow-up study, they show that personalization increases click-through-
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rate regardless of the location of the advertisement, but there is only a positive 
relationship between personalization and view-through visits when the advertisement 
appears on a motive congruent site.  
Several sources of bias increase the difficulty of measuring the precise causal 
impact of display advertising. In addition to exploring the impact of different aspects 
such as location and level of personalization, prior literature has identified interesting 
sources of bias that arise when attempting to execute and analyze a traditional A/B 
experiment in the field. Customer-driven selection bias resulting from heterogeneous 
browsing activity occurs because the ability of an advertiser to serve an advertisement to 
a customer is not a random process. An advertiser’s ability to serve a customer an ad is 
dependent upon the customer actively browsing sites where an advertiser is able and 
willing to purchase impressions. I refer to this bias as customer activity bias (CAB). 
Heterogeneity in both the duration and intensity of browsing behavior creates 
confounding correlation with the probability of exposure and likely hood of response. 
The issue does not arise in the treatment group as advertisers know who was and was not 
exposed to advertisements. The issue lies is the control group. In the simplest 
experimental design, the advertiser withholds advertisements from a portion of the 
population serving as the control. If the advertiser can treat each person on the 
treatment, it is reasonable to assume he could have also treated everyone in the control. 
Since it is not possible to treat each person in the treatment as a result of CAB, it is also 
not possible to treat each person in the control if the advertiser would choose to do so. 
Without knowing who in the control an advertiser could have treated had those persons 
been in the treatment, the simple A/B experimental design results in two groups which 
are no longer identical and without an ability to remove those users in the control group 
who would have been shown an impression to create equivalence. 
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To address the issue of CAB, prior research and practitioners propose the use of 
PSAs. The simplest PSA or public service ad experimental design entails splitting the 
target population into two groups. The treatment groups receive the advertising 
treatment as normal. The nuance of this design occurs in the control group. Instead of 
completely excluding customers randomly assigned to the control from advertising, the 
advertiser attempts to serve ads to those customers just as they would if the customers 
were in the treatment group. When an advertising auction is won, the advertiser serves a 
creative with a completely unrelated message, often on behalf of a charitable 
organization. The advertiser pays the same price to serve the PSA as he would to serve a 
normal impression, and importantly, he receives a transaction log of all PSA 
advertisements served. This allows him to identify those users in the control group 
whom he would have served advertisements to had he chosen to serve them 
advertisements. At the time of analysis, the experimenter can use this information to 
remove the unexposed portion of both the treatment and control groups decreasing 
sample size, but increasing statistical power (Johnson, Lewis, and Reiley 2017). In a 
randomized field experiment Hoban and Bucklin (2015) leverage the PSA experimental 
design, and demonstrate a positive but diminishing marginal effect of display 
advertisements on the likelihood a user returns to site. Particularly, the returns diminish 
slower for customers higher in the purchase funnel suggesting the benefit of building 
awareness for less familiar customers. 
In addition to CAB, the bidding algorithms designed and implemented on behalf 
of advertisers generate a second source of bias conflating results of display advertising 
experiments. A primary benefit of display advertising is the ability to precisely target 
individual users with personalized advertising. A challenge to executing this strategy is 
the necessity to make bidding decision in the RTB setting at scale. The only way to 
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achieve performance is to code the decision-making process into some bidding 
algorithm. Often, agencies or DSPs leverage their expertise to build bidding algorithms 
on behalf of advertisers. Just as humans incorporate new information into their decision 
process as it comes it, the bidding algorithms are built within machine learning 
frameworks such that they update the decision calculus as new information is consumed. 
Often, these algorithms are optimizing towards a specific goal such as achieving a target 
average metric linked to consumer response (e.g., cost-per-click or cost-per-action). 
When using these algorithms in PSA experiments, the algorithms in test and control 
begin optimizing to consumer responses to distinctly different creatives (Johnson, Lewis, 
and Nubbemeyer 2016). Over time, this results in the algorithms in the test and control 
groups targeting distinctly different populations. The bidding algorithm creates an 
additional source of bias, which I term selective-targeting bias (STB). To handle STB, 
Johnson, Lewis, and Nubbemeyer (2016) suggest using “Ghost Ads” as an alternative to 
PSAs. In their proposal, algorithms bid on customers in both treatment and control 
identically throughout the experiment. When an advertiser wins an auction in the “Ghost 
Ad” condition, the ADX awards the inventory to the second-place bidding. Instead of 
showing the winners ad, the “Ghost Ad” is logged for use in analysis. The key piece of this 
design is the experimenting firm receiving a log of every “Ghost Ad” served. In this 
design, firms do not spend advertising dollars on creatives unrelated to the business 
because they forfeit their right to serve “won” impressions.  Additionally, the targeting 
algorithm in the control condition does not learn using behavioral information related to 
an orthogonal creative. Although theoretically sound, marketers cannot implement the 
“Ghost Ad” method on their own. A successful “Ghost Ad” experiment requires the 
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support of the Ad Exchanges6 to collect the data and implement the logic necessary to 
execute this design. 
In addition to CAB and STB confounding control populations, these biases also 
confound the number of ads shown to each user creating endogenous variation in the 
count of impressions shown. Johnson, Lewis, and Reiley (2017) conducted a field 
experiment on the Yahoo! Homepage to generate exogenous variation in the number of 
ads shown to browsers. In addition to using PSAs, they randomly assigned users to one 
of three conditions that varied the ratio of treatment to control impressions. While their 
analysis of the marginal effect of advertising does not yield significant results, they did 
show a directional return suggesting there is a positive marginal benefit to the number of 
impressions shown to a user. To this point, the literature has dedicated a fair amount of 
effort to sufficiently address customer-dependent sources of bias (Barajas et al. 2016; 
Hoban and Bucklin 2015; Johnson, Lewis, and Nubbemeyer 2016; Johnson, Lewis, and 
Reiley 2017), the literature has paid little attention to bias induced by inventory quality.  
Impression Quality in RTB 
In the RTB setting, when a customer browses to a page where the publisher has 
multiple pieces of inventory to sell, each available advertisement is sold simultaneously 
in independent auctions. If the effectiveness of impressions depends on other content on 
the page (Bleier and Eisenbeiss 2015; Goldfarb and Tucker 2011), then one can assume 
the quality of each piece of inventory is uncertain at the time of the auction as it must 
depend on the other advertisements displayed on the page. It is straightforward to 
imagine a situation in which a single piece of inventory becomes less effective purely 
because the creative message displayed in another advertising slot is so eye-catching that 
                                                        
6 https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/intl/en-gb/articles/a-revolution-in-measuring-ad-
effectiveness-knowing-who-would-have-been-exposed.html 
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it decreases the likelihood that a customer notices any other impression on the page. By 
the same logic, it is also reasonable to imagine a situation where all other ads served on a 
page alongside an advertiser’s creative are irrelevant to the user, increasing the 
likelihood the user responds to the advertiser’s message. In either instance, the 
advertiser does not have full information on the quality of the impression on which they 
are bidding because they do not know what other advertisements will also be on the page 
and their influence on the browsing customer’s attitudes. Only when the auction has 
finished, and an advertiser has won does he ascertain information on the quality of 
inventory where he just served his advertising message.  
RTB auctions present advertisers with an unprecedented opportunity for 
marketing precision in budget allocation. The RTB environment enables ad buyers to 
purchase impressions one at a time. RTB auctions are second-price sealed-bid auctions 
in which the dominant strategy for the advertiser is to bid his max willingness to pay. A 
key component to his willingness to pay is inventory quality. All else being equal, his 
willingness to pay will correlate positively with inventory quality. If inventory quality is 
uncertain in real-time, the best strategy for an advertiser is shading his bid up or down 
based on some expectation of quality. Any variation in quality at auction time will 
necessarily affect the number of impressions served. If quality varies towards higher 
quality, bidding the mean expected quality decreases the chances of winning the 
impression. Conversely, if quality varies towards lower quality, bidding the mean quality 
increases the chances of winning an impression. In either case, the advertiser 
simultaneously realizes quality and quantity, which means that when an advertiser is 
interested in understanding the marginal impact of advertising, he must also account for 
variation in inventory quality independent of customer characteristics.  
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Quantifying the quality of an advertisement is a difficult challenge. One way to 
measure quality is to look at the historical clearing prices of a piece of inventory. Under 
an assumption of an efficient marketplace, I propose using the clearing price for a piece 
of inventory as a reasonable proxy for the quality of that piece of inventory at that 
moment in time. The clearing price reflects market demand accounting for variation in 
time of day, day of week, customer information, and historical understanding of the 
impression. When market clearing prices serve as a proxy for quality, then it is 
impossible for an ad buyer to know the quality of inventory prior to placing his bid. If an 
auction is won, the ad buyer simultaneously realizes impression count and inventory 
quality. This simultaneity creates a confounding issue in display field experiments by 
creating unobserved correlation between the number of impressions shown and the 
quality of those impressions. The simultaneous nature of this realization reveals a 
deficiency in previously proposed experimental design methods as it becomes impossible 
to ensure randomized quality throughout all treatment groups and impression 
frequencies. As such, this simultaneous realization of count and quality creates a 
previously unaddressed source of endogeneity to experiments, which I refer to as 
Count/Quality Simultaneity Bias (CQB). 
CQB occurs merely as an artifact of advertisers needing to incorporate judgments 
of inventory quality into their bid in the RTB setting. If advertisers or agencies building 
bidding algorithms are unaware of this phenomenon, then a second type of inventory 
quality related bias may arise. A common practice in advertising is achieving a set 
frequency goal of impressions per person (Cheong, de Gregorio, and Kim 2010; Schmidt 
and Eisend 2015). Setting a frequency goal for an algorithm bidding on real-time display 
advertising tunes the underlying model hit a specific number of impressions per user 
within some budget and timing constraint. Before deciding to bid on any single 
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impression, the algorithm needs information on the number of previously served 
impressions to the user and how many opportunities there are likely to be left in the time 
window in which to achieve the goal. Assuming a fixed budget per person, a low-
frequency goal provides the algorithm the freedom to bid high on a single impression or 
two without exhausting the budget. Early in the goal window and budget, the algorithm 
bids strategically on different types of inventory. If an agency or DSP designs an 
algorithm on behalf of an advertiser, there is the incentive to target the frequency goal 
set by the advertiser as well as full exhaust the budget allocated to the campaign7. As the 
number of expected bidding opportunities decreases, the algorithm must necessarily 
become more aggressive with lower quality inventory to meet the frequency goal. In a 
situation with a high-frequency goal, the algorithm is incentivized to only bid on cheaper 
inventory because the fixed budget may not enable it. I refer to CQB induced by the 
misalignment of goals between the advertiser and the algorithm as Goal Incongruence 
Bias (GIB). 
Given the customer-independent nature of these biases, the literature has 
addressed neither CQB nor GIB. Additionally, existing methods such as PSA control 
groups cannot account for the simultaneous nature of realizing both quality and quantity 
of impressions served to a user. I contribute to the growing literature on display 
advertising measurement by identifying these unaddressed sources of bias, quantifying 
the robust negative impact of these biases on conventional measurement methods, 
proposing a novel identification strategy, and demonstrating the efficacy of my solution 
using a large-scale field experiment.   
                                                        
7 At the end of every fiscal quarter, there is a spike in the average clearing price for all display inventory 
across the Internet. This is assumed to be a function of many agencies working to exhaust the total budget 
allocated to them by their clients.  
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METHODOLOGY 
The ideal experiment for quantifying the marginal impact of digital advertising 
requires randomly assigning users to strict frequency goals and instructing the algorithm 
to bid in whatever manner necessary to achieve the exact goal. As discussed above, this 
exact situation creates both CQB and GIB where users randomly assigned to higher 
frequency goal groups would necessarily receive exposure to lower quality inventory. 
CQB occurs because there is a fundamental negative relationship between count and 
quality and GIB occurs because programming an algorithm to achieve higher quantity 
while holding the budget fixed across groups can exacerbate the CQB issue. In addition 
to CQB and GIB, an experiment of this nature would also be prone to CAB as part of the 
ability of an algorithm to fulfill the frequency goal is dependent upon the number of bid 
opportunities created by user activity. Finally, there are marketplace effects that 
influence the algorithms ability to meet a goal. Even if a user browses enough to provide 
the algorithm enough bid opportunities, the auction dynamics of RTB create a situation 
where winning an impression is always uncertain. If competitors systemically over value 
or under value certain customers, the probability of winning an impression for a user can 
change. These marketplace effects serve as a third source of bias to an ideal experiment. 
Instrumental Variable 
Given the inability to conduct a controlled, randomized experiment, I turn to a 
well-understood econometric approach – instrumental variable regression (Angrist, 
Imbens, and Rubin 1996). Traditionally, econometricians look to naturally occurring 
phenomenon to generate valuable instruments (Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens 2002; 
Angrist and Chen 2011; Levitt 1996, 1997). Instead of looking for naturally occurring 
instruments, I use a novel experimental design to generate an instrumental variable, 
which correlates with the independent variable of interest and uncorrelated with the 
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error term as the treatment occurs through exogenous assignment. Working with a large 
online retailer, I conducted a large-scale field experiment in which I randomly assigned 
users to one of seven different conditions manipulating daily frequency caps. A daily 
frequency cap incorporates a rule into a bidding algorithm that restricts the algorithm 
from bidding if a customer has already been served her allotted number of impressions 
during a time interval. While I could not guarantee that a user will get the exact number 
of impressions she would be assigned to receive in a frequency goal framework, I can 
guarantee that a user in an n-cap group will not receive n+1 impressions. By 
implementing the frequency cap, I artificially restricted the bidding algorithm from 
bidding on a customer who has reached her cap even if the algorithm could have served 
the additional impression. While the number of advertisements served to each user in 
the experiment is still confounded by multiple sources of bias, my experimental design 
created exogenous variation the number of impressions served to each customer. My 
bidding algorithm specified to be independent of customer characteristics generates data 
which is free of selective targeting bias. The use of a daily frequency cap instead of a daily 
frequency goal eliminates the potential for goal incongruence bias. The use of the 
experimental condition as an intention to treat instrument eliminates customer activity 
bias as the first stage of my two-stage least square regression computes the mean 
number of impressions to use in the second stage eliminating any endogenous variation 
in impressions for individual differences in behavior. Most importantly, the intention to 
treat instrument eliminates count quality simultaneity because by controlling for any 
unobserved correlation between count and quality due to the random nature of group 
assignment. The characteristics of this approach which solve each of the four potential 
sources of bias create a distinct ability to generate truly unbiased estimates of the 
marginal causal effect of display advertising in an RTB setting.  
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Experimental Design 
For 30 days prior to the start of the experiment, I randomly assigned all traffic to 
the retailer's site into one of the treatment conditions. The assignment was at the cookie-
level, and each cookie identifies a unique device8. Prior literature has acknowledged the 
deficiency in treating devices as users (Chatterjee, Hoffman, and Novak 2003). To 
minimize the confounding nature of cross-device browsing behavior between mobile and 
desktop, I imposed a desktop-only device restriction. I assumed that cross-device 
browsers are randomly distributed throughout all treatment groups, and thus the impact 
of any mobile or other retargeting campaigns will not bias the results.  
I created seven treatment groups with one, two, three, four, five, and six 
impressions per day limits as well as a final condition which was no daily impression cap. 
I utilized these caps to create as much variation in the instrument as possible while still 
maintaining reasonably sized subsets of customers. Additionally, I included an uncapped 
group to capture the upper bound of possible effect. Prior research studies assumed 
variation in impression frequency to be exogenous to quantify their claim of causal 
impact (Chatterjee, Hoffman, and Novak 2003; Hoban and Bucklin 2015; Manchanda et 
al. 2006). Without directly manipulating impression frequency, both activity bias and 
targeting bias suggest this variation is likely endogenous. Johnson, Lewis, and Reiley 
(2017) took advantage of a natural experiment on the Yahoo! Homepage where two ads 
were rotated based on the second in which server loads the page. This feature created 
exogenous variation within groups of individuals with identical browsing behavior (e.g., 
                                                        
8 A device refers to any unique browser, not physical device. There could be a situation where the same 
person using the same physical device visits the same site using both Google Chrome™ and Mozilla 
Firefox™. Cookie-level tracking treats these browsers as independent devices. Many companies are working 
diligently to create user-specific device graphs that match all known devices to their respective users. The 
limitations of developing a trust-worthy cross-device mapping of each user and the impact on advertising is 
beyond the scope of this work.  
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two individuals who visit Yahoo! exactly ten times), but it was limited to a single website, 
thus holding the quality of the website constant throughout the experiment. This method 
is reasonable for publishers who wish to quantify the impact of an ad on a single site, but 
for advertisers with customers who browse a variety of sites, this method does not 
generalize. 
I began the experiment after the initial 30-day assignment period and focused 
only on those users who visited the partner’s site during the pre-experimental window. I 
ran this experiment for 23 days and impressed 153,561 unique users (approximately 5% 
of the addressable population). To control for creative effects (Braun and Moe 2013), 
every user received the same general creative which consisted of a white background, six 
products they recently viewed, and a message related to pricing. There were slight 
variations due to different sizes of advertisements, but in general, the creative was 
identical throughout the experiment.  
Bidding Algorithm 
As noted by Hoban and Bucklin (2015), instrumental variable regression requires 
knowledge of the bidding algorithm. Targeting bias owing to black-box bidding 
algorithms is one of the largest sources of endogeneity in using field data for this type of 
causal research. The ability to fully program the bidding algorithm was a unique feature 
of my experiment. This key feature provides complete transparency into the “black box,” 
and I was fully aware of any potential targeting biases induced by the algorithm and, 
more importantly, the biases avoided in the algorithm. Many bidding algorithms are 
either proprietary to the company or built by an agency. At a high level, these algorithms 
are designed to spend a higher proportion of the firms advertising dollars on high-value 
customer segments. Since an algorithm can only bid on behalf of a company, it is likely 
bidding higher on customers who are expected to be more responsive. This higher bid 
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correlates with a higher probability of winning a given auction. This outcome generates 
endogenous variation in the number of ads served to different users because customers 
who are more likely to respond are more likely to be served advertisements purely 
because they are more likely to respond. 
Unlike previous studies, I had full transparency into the algorithm bidding on the 
display auctions. Specifically, I defined the precise rules used to bid on users in the 
experiment. I used this opportunity to eliminate all sources of STB and targeted all users 
equally.  
The simplest rule to achieve this goal is setting a single bid for every impression 
such that the bid is unrelated to the user the algorithm is bidding on. Unfortunately, this 
simple rule does not quite achieve what the desired goal because the strategy is also 
unrelated to the piece of inventory on which the algorithm is bidding. Since the clearing 
prices of auctions vary widely and as a function of different sites (e.g., an ad on 
NewYorkTimes.com is more expensive than an ad on coolmathgames.com), a single bid 
is more likely to win a disproportionate number of auctions on lower value sites than on 
higher value sites. Even in the case where a single bid was set sufficiently high, the 
random nature of winning implies this strategy still over-index on lower value sites as 
the same high bid would have a higher probability of winning an auction on a lower 
quality site and a higher quality site. Given the heterogeneous nature of customer 
browsing, the single bid strategy would lead to another source of selection bias. Even 
randomly assigning daily frequency caps, the algorithm hits the daily caps for customers 
who tend to browse on lower priced sites than customers who tend to visit higher value 
sites. 
To address the issue of selective targeting bias created by the bidding algorithm 
treating each customer differently, I designed the bidding algorithm to only vary with the 
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historical performance of each piece of inventory. My goal was to develop a bidding 
strategy in which the probability of winning an auction was identical across all users and 
all inventory. Working with the partner firm, I used historical impression data to model 
a bid for each inventory location independent of the customer characteristics. For each 
site, I looked at the historical distribution of clearing prices and computed the median 
clearing price. I programmed the algorithm to consider only inventory characteristics for 
each unique auction and based on the unique characteristics, bid the estimated median 
inventory-clearing price. Bidding the estimated median price means that for a random 
customer and a random auction, the bidding algorithm had approximately a 50% chance 
of winning an impression and showing customers an ad. Throughout the course of a day, 
if the number of bid opportunities for a given user was sufficiently high, there was a 
strong probability of filling their daily cap. This bidding strategy also serves as a nice 
pacing control in that it prevents the algorithm from filling the specified daily cap for 
each user too quickly, and provides a bit of random time interval between the 
impressions served to customers throughout a day. Unfortunately, I only received 
information on winning bids, so there is no way to validate how the bidding algorithm 
performed regarding winning an expected number of auctions. 
Data Collection 
My data is from a single large online retailer. Data are reported at the cookie-level 
and aggregated across the length of the experiment. While in practice it is possible to 
look at the data in a panel structure (e.g., Hoban and Bucklin 2015), I chose to examine 
the effects at the aggregate level as it best mirrors the general practice of my partner 
company when evaluating the effectiveness of campaigns and updating strategy moving 
forward. 
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Customers were randomly assigned one of the treatment conditions upon landing 
on site during the 30-day pre-experimental window. I leverage the proprietary tool my 
partner has built which splits users based on the customers universally unique identifier9 
and a proprietary algorithm which computes and assigns treatment conditions. This tool 
is used primarily for on-site testing, but my partner was able to adapt its use for external 
marketing campaign testing. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics.    
One of the interesting features of my data is the ability to quantify the 
heterogeneity and historical quality of sites on which advertisements are bought and 
displayed. During the experimental window, there were no restrictions placed on the 
inventory where the algorithm could purchase impressions. Additionally, I had access to 
historical impression logs, which contained information on the domain, size, and 
location along with clearing prices my partner has historically paid and click-through 
rates.  
Although the retailer sells a variety of products, I cannot draw generalized 
conclusions on the effects of display advertising. Instead, I use the data to illustrate the 
presence of unaddressed sources of bias, implications of not addressing the bias, and the 
efficacy of my proposed solution in generating unbiased estimates of effect. Future 
research should explore this method in alternative contexts to ensure it is robust to 
industry and buying behavior.  
  
                                                        
9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universally_unique_identifier 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Treatment Variable Mean Std. Dev. N 
Frequency Cap – 
1/Day (Cap1) 
Impressions 7.368 9.811 
21,463 
Visits 0.749 2.171 
Frequency Cap – 
2/Day (Cap2) 
Impressions 13.741 15.594 
23,605 
Visits 0.768 2.105 
Frequency Cap – 
3/Day (Cap3) 
Impressions 17.31 17.235 
23,047 
Visits 0.78 2.354 
Frequency Cap – 
4/Day (Cap4) 
Impressions 20.259 20.863 
23,155 
Visits 0.775 2.275 
Frequency Cap – 
5/Day (Cap5) 
Impressions 23.624 26.113 
23,443 
Visits 0.862 2.493 
Frequency Cap – 
6/Day (Cap6) 
Impressions 26.148 28.607 
23,498 
Visits 0.823 2.367 
No Frequency 
Cap (NoCap) 
Impressions 91.414 195.67 
15,350 
Visits 0.844 2.31 
Notes: Each group was assigned 15% of allocated traffic except for the 
NoCap group which was assigned the final 10% of traffic.  
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FINDINGS 
Although I account for the two major sources of biases described by previous 
researchers (Hoban and Bucklin 2015, Johnson et al. 2015), it is important to note that I 
am only interested in customers that have already been served at least one impression 
for this work. Consequently, I do not speak to the effectiveness of the first exposure 
owing to the absence of a rigorous control group that ensures counterfactual evidence 
where customers with equal propensity to view an ad do not end up viewing an ad.  
Ordinary Least Squares Approach 
I first used OLS to understand if there is an expected relationship between 
impressions and visits. The results (see Table 2) suggest there is a strictly negative 
relationship between the number of impressions shown and the number of visits to the 
site. These results contradicted my expectation and previous research (Hoban and 
Bucklin 2015). Next, I considered various model specifications by taking the log of 
dependent (visits) and independent variables (impressions). The results of the 
alternative specifications provided further evidence of a highly consistent and robust 
negative effect of impressions on visits.  
Table 2 OLS Results 
OLS Results 
        Visits             ln(Visits + 1) 
Constant 
0.8059  
(0.0063) 
0.8630 
(0.0122) 
0.3182  
(0.0122) 
0.3382  
(0.0032) 
Impressions 
-0.0003* 
(0.0001) 
--- 
-0.0001 
(0.0000) 
--- 
ln(Impressions) --- 
-0.0273 
(0.0045) 
--- 
-0.0097 
(0.0012) 
R2 0.00007 0.00023 0.00016 0.00044 
Notes: All coefficients significant at the p < .0001 level unless otherwise noted, N = 153,561. 
* p < .001 
 
 
25 
 
Since the results sharply contrast my expectations and previous findings in the 
literature, I took further steps and performed additional robustness checks to ensure the 
results were not an unexpected consequence of the proposed experimental design. From 
Table 1, I observed that users in the No Frequency Cap (NoCap) group receive 
substantially more impressions than users in the other treatment conditions. To rule out 
any bias in the initial results driven by the vast number of impressions shown, I 
estimated the same models excluding the NoCap group and continued to find a negative 
relationship between impressions and visits.  
Next, I divided the dataset by treatment condition into seven independent data 
sets and estimate the same models. Again, I found a significant negative relationship 
between impressions and visits. I report the results of the best-fitting log-log model for 
each group in Table 3. All in all, OLS results indicate that despite utilizing the 
customizable features available to me through the collaboration, I am unable to rule out 
the multiple sources of bias endemic to this type of experiment. The descriptive statistics 
illustrate the degree to which activity bias may be influencing the results. If there were 
no activity bias, I would expect the average number of impressions in each treatment 
group to be equal to the daily maximum frequency cap in each group times the length of 
the experiment. 
Table 3 OLS Results for Each Treatment Group 
OLS Results for Each Treatment Group 
 
Treatment Group 
 All 
Capped 
Cap1 Cap2 Cap3 Cap4 Cap5 Cap6 NoCap 
Constant 0.337 0.317 0.314 0.337 0.344 0.381 0.361 0.376 
ln(Imps) 
0.010 -0.012 -0.001 -0.012 -0.014 -0.021 -0.014 -0.015 
N 138,211 21,463 23,605 23,047 23,155 23,443 23,498 15,350 
Adj. R2 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0008 0.0018 0.0009 0.0017 
Notes: Only results for log-log specifications. Results for additional specifications share the same pattern 
and can be provided upon request All coefficients significant at the p < .0001 level unless otherwise notes 
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Count Quality Simultaneity 
I believe CQB drives a portion of the negative bias observed in the previous 
results. As described earlier, CQB occurs because of the uncertain nature of inventory 
before showing an impression. Since quality and quantity are realized simultaneously, it 
is impossible to design an experiment that randomly distributes inventory quality 
throughout the impressions served.  
Using historical data, I computed the average clearing price of all unique pieces 
of inventory on which my partner firm has won an advertising auction starting 60 days 
before the experiment starting and continuing 60 days after the experiment concluded. I 
removed all impressions served as a part of my experiment to keep the quality estimate 
independent of the influence that might happen in my experimental data. Once I 
computed a historical quality score for each piece of inventory, I appended that 
information back to each impression served during the experiment. I then computed the 
average quality of all impressions served to each customer.  
First, I wish to demonstrate that average quality declines as the number of 
impressions increases. I do this by regressing each customer’s inventory quality score 
against the total impressions served during the experiment. I report the results of this 
analysis in Table 4. The results demonstrate a strong significant negative relationship 
between the number of impressions shown and impression quality. Table 5 illustrates 
the robustness of this effect across each of the individual treatment groups. Thus, I use 
this evidence to conclude the existence of a negative CQB. 
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Table 5 Results for Each Treatment Group 
Count Quality Relationship by Treatment Group 
 
Treatment Group 
 
Cap1 Cap2 Cap3 Cap4 Cap5 Cap6 No Cap 
Constant 3.790 
(0.024) 
3.470 
(0.018) 
3.476 
(0.017) 
3.506 
(0.021) 
3.529 
(0.028) 
3.496 
(0.022) 
3.462 
(0.024) 
ln(Imps) -0.013 
(0.002) 
-0.006 
(0.001) 
-0.006 
(0.001) 
-0.005 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
N 21,126 23,291 22,792 22,894 23,227 23,291 15,065 
Adj. R2 0.0021 0.0024 0.0029 0.0025 0.0015 0.0019 0.0066 
Notes: I only report results for linear specifications. Results for additional specifications share the 
same pattern and can be provided upon request. All coefficients significant at the p < .0001 level 
unless otherwise noted. 
 
 
Using the above evidence to illustrate the existence of negative CQB, I include 
impression quality as a covariate and re-estimate the initial OLS model. I expect there to 
be a positive relationship between quality and visits. I also expect the negative coefficient 
of impressions to move towards zero as quality should remove some of the unobserved 
negative correlation in the biased estimate. I report my results in Table 6. As expected, 
there is a significant and positive relationship between quality and the total visits 
observed. Additionally, when comparing with the results in Table 2, I show a decrease in 
Table 4 Count Quality Relationship 
Count Quality Relationship 
 Impression Quality 
Constant 
3.483 
(0.007) 
Impressions 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
Nobs 153,561 
Adj. R2 0.002 
Notes: All coefficients significant at 
p < .0001 level unless otherwise noted 
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the magnitude of the negative coefficient of impressions. I conclude that including 
information on inventory quality can reduce the negative bias in the estimate of 
impression quantity on customer response, but I still have not addressed the remaining 
sources of endogeneity. In the next section, I utilize the experimental conditions as 
instrumental variables and estimate a two-stage least squares regression to get 
completely unbiased estimates of the true causal impact of advertising impressions on 
customer visits.  
Table 6 OLS Accounting for Impression Quality 
OLS Accounting for Impression Quality 
 Visits ln(Visits + 1) 
Constant 
0.7181  
(0.01058) 
0.7727  
(0.0153) 
0.2819  
(0.0027) 
0.3004  
(0.0039) 
Impressions 
-0.0003* 
(0.0001) 
-- 
-0.0001 
(0.0000) 
-- 
ln(Impressions) -- 
-0.0251 
(0.0046) 
-- 
-0.0087 
(0.0012) 
Quality 
0.0261  
(0.0024) 
0.0256  
(0.0024) 
0.0108  
(0.0006) 
0.0106  
(0.0006) 
R2 0.0008 0.0010  0.0021  0.0024  
Notes: All coefficients significant at the p < .0001 level unless otherwise notes; N = 153,561.        
* indicates significance at p < .001 
 
Instrumental Variable Approach 
To estimate the true causal impact of an incremental Ad, I employ the treatment 
conditions as perfect intention to treat instrumental variables in a two-stage least 
squares framework. I formally specify the empirical models as follows: 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑖 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐼(𝐶𝑎𝑝2) +  𝛽2𝐼(𝐶𝑎𝑝3) + 𝛽3𝐼(𝐶𝑎𝑝4) + 𝛽4𝐼(𝐶𝑎𝑝5) +  𝛽5𝐼(𝐶𝑎𝑝6) + 𝛽6𝐼(𝑁𝑜𝐶𝑎𝑝) +
 𝜀𝑖 , (1) 
𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖 , (2) 
where i denotes individuals and Impsi and Visitsi represent the counts of impression and 
site visits of i during the experimental period. I(“group”) is an indicator function which 
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takes the value of one if i belongs to “group” and otherwise zero. 𝜀𝑖 and 𝜐𝑖 are mean-zero 
random shocks. Specifically, 𝜐𝑖 captures the unobserved factors that influence individual 
i’s decision to visit the site. I identified two potential mechanisms that generate 
significant correlation between 𝜐𝑖 and Impsi – CQB and CAB. My treatment condition is 
purely random and therefore must be uncorrelated with unobserved factors captured by 
𝜐𝑖. The treatments influence Impsi as each condition directly manipulated the maximum 
number of impressions a customer was eligible to receive on any given day. As described 
earlier, the treatment conditions satisfy both the inclusion and exclusion restrictions 
necessary for a strong instrument.  
Table 7 reports the results of Equation (1) using OLS. I consider two functional 
forms of the dependent variables – Impsi and ln(Impsi). As expected, I observe that the 
experimental conditions are strong predictors of impressions. The coefficients of group 
indicators increase as the frequency cap is increased indicating that the average 
impressions increase with the frequency cap. These results confirm that my treatment 
condition satisfies the inclusion requirement and the remaining results are not subject to 
the weak instrument problem. 
 
Table 7 First-Stage Estimation Results 
First-Stage Estimation Results 
IV                Impressions ln(Impressions) 
Constant 
7.368 
(0.443) 
1.540 
(0.008) 
I(Cap2) 
6.373 
(0.613) 
0.588 
(0.012) 
I(Cap3) 
9.942 
(0.616) 
0.785 
(0.012) 
I(Cap4) 
12.890 
(0.615) 
0.901 
(0.012) 
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I(Cap5) 
16.256 
(0.614) 
1.001 
(0.012) 
I(Cap6) 
18.780 
(0.613) 
1.071 
(0.012) 
I(No Cap) 
84.045 
(0.686) 
1.616 
(0.0130) 
Adj. R2 0.109    0.108                    
Notes: All coefficients significant at p < .0001 unless  
otherwise notes; N = 153,561. 
 
To estimate Equation (2), I use 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑖̂  instead of Impsi. The predicted impression 
counts serve as a source of exogenous variation to predict the marginal effectiveness of 
an advertisement. In this way, I can tackle the endogeneity problems arising from the 
correlation between 𝜐𝑖 and Impsi. In addition to Equation (2), I estimate the following 
models for robustness, and examine whether the marginal returns to advertising are 
linear, decreasing, or declining: 
𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑖̂ ) +  𝜐𝑖,                                                                          
(3) 
𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑖̂ + 𝛾2𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑖
2̂ +  𝜐𝑖.                                                             
(4) 
In addition to Visitsi, I also consider ln(Visitsi + 1) as a dependent variable. I use 
the same instrument, the treatment conditions, in my estimation of all models.  
Table 8 reports the estimation results of each model specifications using 
instrumental variables. First, I observe that the effect of impressions on visits is now 
positive and significant (Model 1 and Model 4). This finding indicates that there is a 
strong negative correlation between Impsi and 𝜐𝑖. When this correlation is not properly 
handled, OLS results in biased estimates as I have already reported in Table 2. I conclude 
that the associated between Impsi + 1) and 𝜐𝑖 is substantial and when not properly 
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addressed, can lead to incorrect conclusions. Additionally, the results in Model 1 (Model 
4) indicate that when impressions increase by one unit, the number of visits a customer 
makes increases by 0.001 (0.03%) 
Models 3-4 and 5-6 examine the nature of the marginal effect of advertisement. 
In both dependent variables (Visits and ln(Visits + 1)), the results of Models 2 and 5 
support a decreasing marginal effect of impressions. Using ln(Impsi) and adding a 
square term improves the model fit (R2). Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the estimated 
non-linear relationships between impression and visit of Model 5 and Model 6. 
 
Table 8 Second-Stage Estimation Results 
Second-Stage Estimation Results 
 Visits ln(Visits + 1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 
0.7736 
(0.00883
) 
0.631 
(0.033) 
0.68917 
(0.0223) 
0.3077 
(0.0023) 
0.268 
(0.009) 
0.2864 
(0.0058) 
Impressions 
0.0010 
(0.0003) 
-- 
0.00687 
(0.0015) 
0.0003 
(0.0001) 
-
- 
0.0018 
(0.0004) 
Impressions2 
-
- 
-- 
-0.00006 
(0.0000) 
-- 
-
- 
-0.00001 
(0.00000) 
ln(Imps) 
-
- 
0.071 
(0.014) 
--  
0.021 
(0.004) 
-- 
R2 0.00009 0.00017 0.00019 0.00012 0.00022 0.00024 
Notes: All coefficients significant at the p < .0001 level unless otherwise notes, N=153,561 
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Figure 1. Decreasing Marginal Effect of Ad on Visit 
 
Figure 2. Diminishing Marginal Effect of Ad on Visit 
 
 
Field Study  
In this section, I use the response function estimated above in an optimization 
framework to solve the optimal daily frequency cap. I test the results of my findings in a 
follow-up field study. Using data collected during my previous experiment, I calibrate 
the relationship between total impressions served and dollars spent per person. I then 
pair the ad response function with the cost function to solve for the profit-maximizing 
daily frequency cap. Using information from my partner on the general value of an 
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incremental visit, I add a new rule to my partner’s current best-performing bidding 
algorithm to dictate the optimal caps using a solution derived from the optimization. I 
report anonymized results from the follow-up field study and show that implementing 
the optimal frequency caps decreases both revenue and cost of the program, but slightly 
increases the return on investment.  
Cost Function 
Advertisements exchanged in RTB environments are typically bought and sold in 
CPM units. CPM is a metric common to media across various channels and stands for the 
cost per 1,000 impressions. Some DSPs allow advertisers to place cost-per-click or CPC 
bids, but subsequently translate those values into an effective CPM given some expected 
click-through rate as modeled by the DSP. While bids and costs are typically reported in 
CPM units, advertisers pay only for a single impression. For example, if an advertiser 
wins an auction at a $2.00 CPM, they are paying $.002 to display their advertisements. 
An alternative to CPM is pay-per-click (PPC). This payment structure is the common 
structure in paid search advertising where advertisers compete for priority in search 
rankings and are only responsible for paying the publisher when a customer clicks the 
sponsored search result(Rutz, Bucklin, and Sonnier 2012). Unlike paid search 
advertising (Skiera and Abou Nabout 2013), in a display advertising environment, the 
advertiser is responsible for paying for every impression won in the auction. 
While it is evident that total advertising spend must increase as the number of 
advertising impression auctions won increases, the exact nature of that relationship is 
unknown. I use data collected during the initial field study to examine the relationship 
between the total cost and the number of impressions shown. Formally, I specify the cost 
model as: 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 =  𝛿0Impressionsi + 𝜖𝑖  (5) 
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where Spendi is the total spent and Impressionsi is the number of impressions shown to 
individual i. 𝜖𝑖 is mean zero randomly distributed shock. I specified an intercept free 
model because intuitively, if zero impressions are shown, an advertiser spends nothing. I 
estimate Equation 5 using OLS and report my results in Table 9. A positive estimate of 𝛿0 
demonstrates the expected positive relationship between total spend and impressions. 
The reported R2 of .895 demonstrates an extremely strong fit. I am confident my cost-
side model provides robust results to include in the subsequent optimization.  
 
Table 9 Cost Function OLS 
Cost Function OLS 
                         Cost 
Imps 
.0027 
(0.0000) 
R2 .895 
Notes: All coefficients significant at the p 
< .0001 level unless otherwise notes. N = 
153,561.  
 
 
Optimization 
Firms can set many different types of goals for their advertising program. For 
example, a firm attempting to build brand awareness might invest to maximize reach 
and frequency given a budget constraint (Danaher, Lee, and Kerbache 2010). 
Alternatively, a firm with strong brand awareness may seek to maximize the profit of the 
direct response aspect of advertising. For this optimization, I take the latter approach 
and use the ad response and cost functions to solve for the profit-maximizing daily 
frequency cap.  
Using Equation (3), the response model, and Equation (5), the cost model, I 
formally state the profit-maximizing optimum as: 
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max
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑠
Π(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑠) (6) 
I specify profit as the difference between the consumer response function given some 
constant C value of a visit and the cost as a function of impressions: 
Π(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑠) =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1 ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑠)𝐶 −  𝛿0𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑠 (7) 
The first-order conditions for Equation (7) are: 
𝜕
𝜕𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑠
=  
𝛾1𝐶
𝑥
− 𝛿0 (8) 
Table 10 contains the resulting daily optimal for a distribution of expected value 
per visits. The results in this table illustrate the profit-maximizing daily caps heavy 
reliance on the economic value of a visit. Since Equation 3 does not directly capture 
revenue, I assume the value of all visits are equal, and any incremental increase in the 
number of visits made by a customer will result in increased revenue. I solved this 
optimization using Excel Solver with an integer constraint on the solution. Figure 3 
demonstrates there is a range of decisions, which will result in a profit in a situation 
where the expected value of a visit is, on average, $5. The profit-maximizing solution 
when visits are expected to be worth $5 is either two or three impressions per day. When 
choosing between these two solutions, a firm interested in maximizing revenue as a 
secondary goal should choose a three impression per day limit. Alternatively, if the firm 
wishes to maximize ROI, the final decision should be for two impressions per day as the 
expected profit is the same, but the total cost is greater for three impressions per day 
compared to two.  
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Table 10 Simulated Results of Optimization 
Simulated Results of Optimization 
Daily Cap $2.50 Per Visit $5 Per Visit $10 Per Visit 
1  $0.16   $0.38   $0.83  
2  $0.15   $0.42   $0.97  
3  $0.12   $0.42   $1.03  
4  $0.08   $0.40   $1.05  
5  $0.03   $0.37   $1.06  
6  $(0.02)  $0.34   $1.05  
7  $(0.07)  $0.30   $1.04  
8  $(0.12)  $0.26   $1.01  
9  $(0.17)  $0.21   $0.99  
10  $(0.23)  $0.17   $0.96  
15  $(0.51)  $(0.08)  $0.77  
20  $(0.79)  $(0.35)  $0.55  
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Figure 3.  Field Study Optimized Frequency Caps 
 
 
The goal of my optimization was to identify the profit-maximizing daily frequency 
cap for my partner to improve channel performance. Using this framework, I tested the 
efficacy of my optimization in a follow-up study. Currently, my partner has implemented 
a ten impression per day cap for the channel, a solution they arrived at using experience-
based heuristics. Comparing this cap to the results from my optimization, this ten 
impression per day limit along with their current targeting algorithm should and does 
result in measurable incremental revenue for the firm. However, a rule of ten 
impressions per day is not necessarily the profit-maximizing solution. Based on the 
results of the optimization, I believe the firm can improve channel performance from a 
profit and ROI perspective without sacrificing a significant portion of revenue by setting 
a daily individual-level impression cap using this framework. 
I tested the optimized frequency caps against the current ten-impression per day 
limit by cloning the existing best performing campaign including the exact targeting 
algorithm used in practice. In addition to cloning the exact setup, I also added a layer of 
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decision-making to the algorithm to implement the optimal frequency cap. The only 
difference is that instead of a ten impression per day frequency cap, I imposed a model-
derived frequency cap. I collected data for two weeks in the spring of 2017. I observed a 
29.8% decrease in total profit for the channel. I do observe a 30.2% decrease in total 
spend, but this is offset by a 29.9% decrease in total revenue. So, while overall, the 
frequency cap decreased both revenue and profit, it decreased profit at a slower rate.  
While these results are unexpected, I cannot draw any significant conclusions 
about the efficacy of my approach from this test for multiple reasons. First, I estimated 
the response model using data collected from the entire population of browsers whereas 
the current algorithm utilized in the test targets a finely tuned subset of the population 
determined by the partner firm. Additionally, while my model derived caps suggested a 
global ten impression per day cap was too high, the firm realizes an average a daily 
impression frequency much lower than ten. It could be that the algorithm was targeting a 
subset of customers who experience a slower diminishing marginal return than the 
model estimated. Furthermore, it could be that the bidding algorithm takes advantage of 
market forces by bidding low enough to decrease the probability of serving wasteful ads 
to much of the targeted population. To generate more interpretable validation results, I 
suggest the firm implement my proposed experimental design but restrict the population 
of customers included in that experiment to the segments they are currently targeting in 
their campaigns.  
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DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
CQB presents a significant challenge to marketing managers looking to optimize 
their marketing spend for online display advertising. Prior research has suggested that 
managers take advantage of experimental techniques such as PSAs and Ghost 
Advertisements. I have shown that while these serve as an effective solution to bias that 
arises when trying to measuring the impact of the presence of a single advertisement, 
these strategies are not able to eliminate the impact of CQB when measuring the 
marginal impact of more than one advertisement. In this section, I propose two 
suggestions for managers who wish to address CQB and the impact of effective 
marketing and marketing measurement.  
First, I propose that managers run similar field experiment at random intervals 
throughout the year. In this research, I propose and implement a straightforward 
experimental design to mitigate the influence of CQB on measuring advertising 
effectiveness. Managers should implement or work with their display-advertising 
partners to implement an identical design. Once the data is collected, managers can 
estimate the unbiased marginal impact of their display advertising campaign. This 
strategy is most applicable to managers who are primarily interested in proper 
attribution compared to efficient spending. Executing this experiment takes resources in 
terms of time and money as it necessitates a portion of advertising spending on 
ineffective advertisements served on low-quality inventory. However, without that 
information, managers cannot derive the true value of an incremental advertisement.  
Second, for managers primarily interested in improving the efficiency of 
advertising spend, I recommend restricting their purchasing of display advertising to 
only the highest quality inventory through specific site targeting and by leveraging direct 
buys and private marketplace deals. This strategy ensures the subsequent impressions 
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are not of lower quality by restricting the pool of possible impressions to only high 
quality. It should remove the negative correlation between advertising quality and 
advertising quantity by restricting all advertisements to be purchased from a 
homogenous set of high-quality advertisements. Inopportunely, this strategy is not 
without its limitations as well. Primarily, by manually restricting inventory, marketing 
managers forego the ability to learn about new inventory or adapt to 
improving/worsening inventory. Additionally, this manual limitation of inventory 
necessarily restricts the population whom managers reach by worsening the customer-
driven selection bias discussed earlier. 
Unfortunately, there is no perfect solution to the issue of CQB. Managers need to 
choose the solution that best matches their strategic goals. The best solution is 
potentially a flighted combination of the above two proposals where managers trade off 
running rigorous field experiments to explore and test on new data and follow with 
campaigns on heavily restricted inventory. Most importantly, managers need to be aware 
of CQB and the impact it has on measuring the effectiveness of incremental digital 
advertisements. Without an awareness of this issue, managers may draw incorrect 
conclusions concerning the effectiveness of their digital marketing strategy and either 
over- or under-invest in the channel. 
Recommendation for Future Research 
To properly execute my experiment, I necessarily restricted the creative message 
shown to a single variation. With the opportunity to dynamically change the content of 
digital advertising on an impression by impression basis, modeling the impact of a single 
creative is potentially limiting. Future research in the area of digital advertising 
effectiveness should explore how creative sequencing can mitigate the diminishing 
marginal impact of consecutive advertisements. One might even imagine a scenario 
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where a proper sequence of messages increases the consumer response by telling a 
compelling story driving the customer back to site in a more purchase-oriented mindset. 
Executing the necessary experiment to measure this is tricky as it requires the ability to 
specifically control the number of advertisements a user sees and the creative that is 
shown as a function of the number of advertisements already shown. Emerging display 
platforms are testing this functionality, but at this point, there is not a widely available 
solution to execute this type of experiment.   
In addition to creative sequencing, future research should examine how CQB is 
influenced by heterogeneity in the population. Prior research has shown that customer-
driven activity bias happens through heterogeneous browsing behaviors. In my study, I 
looked at the entire population together to demonstrate the global existence of the 
phenomena as well as a simple experimental design to mitigate the impact.  An 
important next step is to examine if CQB is systematic across all subpopulations or if it 
there are certain segments where the influence is more pervasive on measurement than 
others.  Future research  should replicate this same experiment, but focus the analysis on 
meaningful subsets of the population 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I measured the marginal causal impact of display advertising 
using a large-scale randomized field experiment. I identified two previously unaddressed 
sources of bias that confound the marginal measurement. First, Count/Quality 
Simultaneity bias is when both the number of impressions served and simultaneously 
realize the overall quality of those impressions. This bias owes to the nature of RTB and 
is driven by the uncertain nature of inventory quality before winning an ad auction. 
Second, Goal Incongruence bias occurs when the goals of the algorithm or third-party 
firm do not perfectly align with the advertiser. Specifically, if the goal is to meet a 
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specified frequency requirement, the algorithm working to achieve the goal can create 
CQB.  
I proposed a novel experimental design to address these new sources of bias as 
well as the additional sources of biased discussed in the literature. By designing an 
experiment where customers are randomly assigned to various frequency caps and 
writing the exact rules of the bidding algorithm, I create perfect intention-to-treat 
instruments. To my knowledge, this is the first study on ad effectiveness leveraging an 
experiment to generate exogenous variation in the number of impressions shown to 
users across a vastly heterogeneous distribution of web pages. Using the treatment 
conditions as instruments, I model the unbiased marginal causal impact of display 
retargeting. 
By comparing the results of the OLS to those utilizing the instrumental variable, I 
demonstrate the importance of properly identifying and addressing all sources of bias 
with measuring the causal impact of display advertising. I highlight CQB and GIB as two 
previously unaddressed sources of bias which can only be handled using my novel 
experimental framework.  
In addition to arriving at an unbiased estimate of the true causal value of an 
advertisement, I demonstrate how the results can be extended to solve for the profit-
maximizing daily frequency cap. I found evidence of the linear relationship between 
costs and the number of impressions served. Given there is no decrease in cost, limiting 
impressions can help ad buyers reduce their overall ad budget. The realized savings can 
either be reallocated to reach new customers or reinvested in other marketing channels. 
The results of this work serve as a cautionary tale to ad buyers when attempting 
to model data at face value. If a buyer were to build a bidding algorithm based on the 
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initial OLS model, the buyer would not build an algorithm at all. In fact, the buyer would 
simply stop spending and reallocate all marketing dollars away from this channel. 
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